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Abstract.  To date, the turn toward market-based regulatory tools in the 
environmental, health, and safety context has tended to focus on taxes, 
tradable permits, and information disclosure rules, with comparatively little 
attention devoted to environmental assurance bonds.  This paper argues that 
environmental assurance bonding offers a particularly attractive regulatory 
approach for contexts – such as the present state of nanoscale science and 
engineering – in which both the risk and the benefit sides of the regulatory 
equation are characterized by great uncertainty.  Historical examples and 
existing scholarly analyses of environmental assurance bonding are reviewed, 
and the resulting lessons are situated within the larger debate over economic 
cost-benefit balancing and precautionary approaches to environmental law 
and policy.  In particular, the paper argues that environmental assurance 
bonding displays the virtue of symmetric humility, paying due heed to the 
dynamism and complexity both of sociolegal systems such as markets and of 
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“Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.” 
-- H.G. Wells, Outline of History (1920) 
 
  On January 30, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama issued a memorandum to the 
heads of executive departments and agencies expressing an intention to study and revise the 
manner in which the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) conducts regulatory impact review, including economic 
cost-benefit analysis of proposed rules.  He wrote: 
The fundamental principles and structures governing contemporary 
regulatory review were set out in Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 
1993.  A great deal has been learned since that time. Far more is now known 
about regulation – not only about when it is justified, but also about what 
works and what does not.  Far more is also known about the uses of a variety 
of regulatory tools such as warnings, disclosure requirements, public 
education, and economic incentives. Years of experience have also provided 
lessons about how to improve the process of regulatory review. In this time 
of fundamental transformation, that process – and the principles governing 
regulation in general – should be revisited. 
 
I therefore direct the Director of OMB, in consultation with representatives 
of regulatory agencies, as appropriate, to produce within 100 days a set of 
recommendations for a new Executive Order on Federal regulatory review. 
Among other things, the recommendations should offer suggestions for the 
relationship between OIRA and the agencies; provide guidance on disclosure 
and transparency; encourage public participation in agency regulatory 
processes; offer suggestions on the role of cost-benefit analysis; address the 
role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern for the interests of 
future generations; identify methods of ensuring that regulatory review does 
not produce undue delay; clarify the role of the behavioral sciences in 
formulating regulatory policy; and identify the best tools for achieving public 
goals through the regulatory process. 
 
Under pressure from nongovernmental organizations such as the Center for Progressive 
Reform,1 the Executive Order review process was opened up for broader public comment.  
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The resulting input suggests that, despite the President’s suggestion that “a great deal has 
been learned” regarding the design and impact of regulations, civil society remains deeply 
split regarding the desirability of regulatory cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a tool for 
evaluating proposed policies.2  Numerous commentators focused their suggestions on 
incremental methodological improvements to CBA, expressing unequivocal support for the 
core idea of evaluating the content of policies based on their predicted overall impacts for 
human well-being.  Several others, however, raised serious moral and political objections to 
the use of the CBA methodology.  They offered instead a vision of policymaking much more 
pluralistic in its conception of value and much more pragmatic in its assumptions regarding 
the availability and certitude of empirical knowledge regarding policy effects.  Although these 
commentators tended not to invoke the principle by name, their recommendations followed 
a course that internationally has come to be associated with the Precautionary Principle 
(PP).3  
                                                 
2 These comments are available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp. 
3 The PP is a decision heuristic that counsels erring on the side of safety when scientific uncertainty 
exists over the potential consequences of an action.  Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration attempts to capture the 
desired relationship between the PP and environmental law: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Declaration of Principles, 31 I.L.M. 874 
(1992).  Despite this international recognition, the PP remains somewhat ill-formed in policy discussions.  As 
one commentator put it, “though the precautionary principle provides a useful overall orientation, it is an 
insufficient basis for policy and largely lacks legal content.”  Daniel Bodansky, Commentary:  The 
Precautionary Principle, Environment, April 1992, at 4.  Defenders of the principle contend that it appears ill-
formed or devoid of content only when evaluated from the very formalistic and rationalist vantage point that 
the principle aims to critique.  See, e.g., Jordan & O’Riordan, p. 16 (“Like sustainability, [the PP] is neither a 
well-defined nor a stable concept.  Rather, it has become the repository for a jumble of adventurous beliefs that 
challenge the status quo of political power, ideology and environmental rights.  Neither concept has much 
coherence other than is captured by the spirit that is challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost-
benefit analysis, the powerlessness of the victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of 
intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity.  It is because the mood of the times needs an organizing 
idea that the precautionary principle is getting attention.”). 
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The divide between supporters of CBA and the PP is related to a more general split 
found within environmental law and policy circles, one so stark and staunchly policed as to 
occasionally resemble a world of environmental tribalism.4  In this world, proponents of 
“cool analysis” and “moral outrage,”5 or what Christopher Schroeder calls environmental 
“priests” and “philosophers,”6 seem unwilling to alter or compromise their positions, leading 
to a perception that the debate over environmental, health, and safety regulation is based on 
philosophical differences that simply cannot be overcome.  Daniel Farber, for instance, 
worries that the conflict between “tree huggers” and “bean counters” reflects a divide over 
whether environmental law and policy should be determined by “willingness to vote” or 
“willingness to pay” that is simply insurmountable.7  Of late, those on the “moral 
outrage”/“philosopher”/“tree hugger” side of the environmental law and policy divide have 
come in for harsh critique and commentary from their opponents, suggesting that 
supporters of the economic approach are seeking a total victory, rather than agreement on 
some integrated compromise.  Supporters of CBA, for instance, have dismissed the PP in 
especially strident terms, describing the principle as “incoherent,”8 “indeterminate,”9 
“paralyzing,”10 and “literally senseless.”11  Indeed, proponents of CBA have begun to declare 
                                                 
4 See Kysar & Salzman, supra note __, at __. 
5 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 73 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
6 Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests and Pragmatists, 87 MINN. L. REV. __ (2003). 
7 FARBER, supra note __, at 39-42. 
8 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?:  The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE WES. L. REV. 
315, 333 (2002). 
9 Stone, supra note __, at 10799.  
10 Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1004. 
11 Id. at 1008.  For further critical commentary regarding the PP, see Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note __; Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002); M. GOKLANY, THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE:  A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001); 
Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790 (2001); Adler, supra note __; 
HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 75-79 (1996); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary 
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victory for themselves, describing the “first generation debate” regarding CBA’s basic 
normative desirability as over, and asserting that the important questions today concern 
“second generation” issues regarding how best to implement CBA in the risk regulation 
context.12    
 In a forthcoming book,13 I defend the conceptual coherence and normative 
desirability of policy approaches, such as those associated with the PP, that reject the idea 
that environmental, health, and safety law ever can be adequately addressed from an 
assumed viewpoint of objectivity.  The danger, I argue, is that the attempt to render 
environmental, health, and safety regulation fully determinable through empirical assessment 
and formalized decisionmaking models – an attempt found most influentially in the 
methodology of CBA, but associated more generally with the economic regulatory reform 
project of the last three decades – obscures the relation of agency and responsibility that the 
political community bears to its decisions.  Even robust institutional actors such as nation-
states confront forces that lie beyond complete prediction and control, such as the 
operations of natural systems that escape precise probabilistic understanding, the actions of 
foreign nations and other non-subjects that depend on and impact shared resources, and the 
future needs and circumstances of unborn generations that are a necessary, but unknowable 
feature of any policy decision involving intergenerational consequences.  I argue that, within 
such a decisionmaking context, the political community must always in a nontrivial sense 
stand outside of its tools of policy assessment, maintaining a degree of self-awareness and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS 
RISK (1995). 
12 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE xi (2002).  See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK & 
REASON:  SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) at 5-6 (asserting that “‘first-generation’ debate about 
whether to base regulatory choices on cost-benefit analysis at all . . . is now ending, with a substantial victory 
for the proponents of cost-benefit analysis”).   
13 Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity 
(under contract, Yale University Press, forthcoming 2010). 
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self-criticality regarding the manner in which its agency is exercised.  The PP encourages 
such conscientiousness by reminding the political community, as it stands poised on the 
verge of a policy choice with potentially serious or irreversible environmental consequences, 
that its actions matter, that they belong uniquely to the community and will form a part of its 
narrative history and identity, helping to underwrite its standing in the community of 
communities that includes other nations, other generations, and other forms of life.  Such 
considerations, in contrast, hold no clear or secure place within the logic of cost-benefit 
optimization, tending as it does to deny the political community a view from within itself, 
and to ask the community, in essence, to regulate from nowhere. 
This Article seeks to make a more modest, but also more grounded contribution:  It 
argues that the turn toward market-based policy instruments in environmental, health, and 
safety law has focused unduly on the use of pollution taxes and tradable permits, and that a 
third market-based instrument, the environmental assurance bond, offers features that should 
commend it both to “tree huggers” and to “bean counters,” to “philosophers” and to 
“priests.”  Especially in the context of a nascent field such as nanoscale science and 
engineering, within which available information regarding potential consequences is highly 
incomplete and uncertain, the environmental assurance bond is a normatively attractive 
policy tool because it displays the virtue of symmetric humility.14  Promoters of CBA support 
                                                 
14 Albert Lin has also argued that environmental assurance bonding offers an especially attractive 
policy approach for the burgeoning field of nanoscale science and engineering, which is characterized by 
uncertain but potentially dramatic effects, both in terms of the benefits it promises and the harms it threatens.  
See Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2007).  For other 
analyses of regulatory aspects of nanoscale science and engineering, see NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (Kathleen Sellers, Christopher Mackay, Lynn Bergeson, Stephen Clough, Marilyn Hoyt, Julie 
Chen, Kim Henry, & Jane Hamblen, eds., 2008); Kenneth W. Abbott, Gary E. Marchant, & Douglas J. 
Sylvester, A Framework Convention for Nanotechnology?, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10507 (2008); 
Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323 (2008); David B. Fischer, Nanotechnology -- 
Scientific And Regulatory Challenges, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 315 (2008); James Yeagle, Nanotechnology and the FDA, 12 
VA. J.L. & TECH 6 (2007); Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. Sylvester, Transnational Models For Regulation Of 
Nanotechnology, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 714 (2006); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge Of 
Regulating Known Unknowns, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 704 (2006); Linda K. Breggin, Leslie Carothers, Governing 
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analytical requirements for regulators that presuppose simplicity, predictability, and 
manipulability in the environment.  In essence, they support something like central planning 
for the environment, even though they would abhor such planning in the economy.  
Regulatory reformers do so because they believe that economic incentives are sufficiently 
powerful – and private interactions sufficiently reliable – to promote overall human well-
being with greater success than fallible and corruptible government agencies.  Hence, in their 
view, regulators should be required to overcome a substantial burden of proof before 
interfering with the dynamism and complexity of the market.  Conversely, PP proponents 
recommend precautionary and protective regulation because they appreciate the fragility and 
interconnectedness of ecological systems.  Hence, they would place a substantial burden of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Uncertainty:  The Nanotechnology Environmental, Health, And Safety Challenge, 31 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 285 (2006); 
Francisco Castro, Legal And Regulatory Concerns Facing Nanotechnology, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 140 (2004); K. 
Eric Drexler & Jason Wejnert, Nanotechnology and Policy, 45 Jurimetrics J. 1 (2004); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy:  Three Futures, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179 (2003); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 (2001). 
For analyses of environmental assurance bonds as regulatory compliance tools, see David Gerard & 
Elizabeth J. Wilson, Environmental Bonds and the Challenge of Long-Term Carbon Sequestration, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 
1097 (2009); Robert F. Blomquist, Models and Metaphors for Encouraging Responsible Private Management of 
Transboundary Toxic Substances Risk:  Toward a Theory of International Incentive-Based Environmental Experimentation, 18 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 507 (1997); Monique Lee Hawthorne, Confronting Toxic Work Exposure in China:  The 
Precautionary Prinicple and Burden-Shifting, 37 ENVTL. L. 151 (2007); D.F. Ferreira & S.B. Suslick, Identifying the 
Potential Impacts of Bonding Instruments on Offshore Oil Projects, 27 Resources Pol’y 43 (2001); David Gerard, The Law 
and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 26 RESOURCES POL’Y 189 (2000); David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining 
Sustainable Development:  NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1998); MICHAEL COMMON, 
SUSTAINABILITY AND POLICY:  LIMITS TO ECONOMICS (1995); Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price 
Biodiversity?  Economics Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 9 (1996); 
Duangjai Intarapravich & Allen L. Clark, Performance Guarantee Schemes in the Minerals Industry for Sustainable 
Development, 20 RESOURCES POL’Y 59 (1994); Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial 
Redevelopment:  Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOL. L. Q. 705 (1994); Robert Costanza & Laura 
Cornwell, The 4P Approach to Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty, ENV’T, at 12, Nov. 1992; Robert Costanza & 
Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System for Improved Environmental Management, 2 ECOL. ECON. 57 
(1990); Barbara S. Webber & David J. Webber, Promoting Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection in the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:  An Analysis of the Design and Implementation of Reclamation 
Performance Bonds, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 389 (1985).  Some discussion has also been given to assurance 
bonding in the context of wetlands mitigation banks, although the role played by the bonds in that context is 
somewhat distinctive.  See Jennifer L. Bolger, Creating Economic Incentives to Preserve Unique Ecosystems:  Should 
Wisconsin Adopt a Private Wetlands Mitigation Banking Policy?, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 625 (2000); Federal Guidance for the 
Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605, 58613 (Nov. 28, 1995).  Finally, one 
paper has suggested the use of bonds that are convertible into corporate stock as a compliance incentive 
mechanism.  See André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible 
Bonds, 50 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 637 (2005). 
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proof on private actors seeking to introduce new substances or technologies, to alter existing 
land uses, or to otherwise interfere with the dynamism and complexity of the environment.  
Like the asymmetric humility of their opponents, however, supporters of the PP arguably 
downplay the severity and significance of these same traits when it comes to sociolegal 
systems, ignoring problems associated with regulation such as unintended consequences, 
compensating behaviors, and agency capture. 
The environmental assurance bond tries to steer a middle course between these 
extremes of asymmetric humility.  Unlike typical cost-benefit approaches, environmental 
assurance bonding acknowledges uncertainty regarding the value, resilience, and 
replaceability of biophysical systems by assessing serious ex ante financial responsibility for 
the potential causation of environmental harm.  At the same time – and in contrast to strict 
interpretations of the PP – environmental assurance bonding acknowledges the strength and 
dynamism of sociolegal systems such as markets by allowing private actors to proceed with 
potentially beneficial activities despite the existence of a credible risk of harm.  Indeed, 
environmental assurance bonding actively marshals the decentralized decisionmaking power 
of markets as a force for the development of knowledge regarding uncertain substances and 
activities.  As such, the policy approach reflects a high degree of what might be called 
ecological rationality, approaching ill-posed regulatory problems with a pragmatic combination 
of respect for the power of markets and human technology, and caution before the 
complexities of nature.15  Critically, previous academic discussions of environmental 
assurance bonds have tended to understate the epistemic challenge facing regulators.  They 
have approached the pros and cons of environmental assurance bonds from an efficiency-
                                                 
15 As note infra text accompanying notes __-__, cognitive psychologists have coined the term ecological 
rationality to refer to choice and judgment heuristics that are well-adapted to real-world decisionmaking 
environments in which optimific approaches, such as CBA or formal axiomatic systems, founder. 
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oriented perspective in which the “optimal” level of safety incentive can in principle be 
identified and applied to private actors, rather than from a more dynamic institutional 
perspective in which a substantial aim of the regulatory project is to influence how we come to 
know what we will come to know.  Indeed, the feature of environmental assurance bonding that 
commentators tend most to critique – the requirement that financial assurance obligations be 
set at a level equal to the worst-case outcome threatened by the regulated activity – in fact 
represents the very heart of the approach’s pragmatic wisdom.  Recognizing that for many 
regulatory issues the “right” or “optimal” level of safety incentive cannot in principle be 
identified, supporters of environmental assurance bonding instead utilize the worst-case 
outcome approach precisely in order to incentivize the development of greater 
understanding regarding the regulated activity’s potential consequences. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Part I draws on complexity theory to describe 
the regulatory landscape, both as it pertains to biophysical systems such as aquatic 
environments and sociolegal systems such as product markets.  As Part I describes, 
differences in ontological outlook tend to drive differences in scientific agenda:  While 
classically-oriented scientists hope to achieve convergence at the nanoscale by fusing 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science into a single, 
unified and comprehensive scientific field,16 ecologists, conservation biologists, and other 
observers of complex adaptive systems emphasize the ineliminable phenomenon of emergence, 
whereby certain system properties appear at the macroscale in a manner that simply cannot 
be predicted or explained through an examination of constituent system components alone.  
Part II argues that the former approach tends to instill technological optimism and a 
conviction that human ingenuity and progress generally can overcome any impediments and 
                                                 
16 See http://www.infocastinc.com/nbic/nbichome.htm. 
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scarcities posed by the natural world.  The latter approach, in contrast, tends to counsel 
humility and caution in the face of inevitable – and often unpleasant – ecological surprise.  
Part II further uses teachings of decision theory and cognitive psychology to reveal 
complementary inadequacies in the policymaking approaches that are epitomized by CBA 
and the PP.  Finally, in light of these complementary inadequacies, Part III argues that 
participants in the risk regulation debate should offer their support for policy tools, such as 
environmental assurance bonds, that give due respect to the most critical aspects of both 
CBA and the PP.  Reduced to a slogan, ecological rationality demands symmetric humility.  
 
I.  UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
Managing the risks of a nascent field such as nanoscale science and engineering is a 
perplexing task, characterized by great uncertainty and likelihood of tradeoffs.  For instance, 
the same properties that make nanomaterials attractive as industrial inputs – namely, their 
increased reactivity and often dramatically altered optical, electrical, and magnetic behavior 
compared to macroscale counterparts – also make their toxicity and environmental fate 
difficult to predict and assess.  For instance, given their miniscule size, nanomaterials may 
penetrate cells more easily than larger materials, a feature that makes them attractive as 
potential drug delivery devices, but that also raises concerns about their potential adverse 
health effects.17  Similarly, although scientists expect to achieve a host of breakthroughs in 
electrical and mechanical engineering by using highly conductive carbon nanotubes which 
are as strong as steel but which remain remarkably light and flexible, regulators increasingly 
are expressing concern that such tubes seem also to share many of the physical and 
                                                 
17 See The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, supra note __, at ix.  See id. at __. 
Extremely early draft – please do not cite, quote, or reproduce without permission 
 11
toxicological characteristics of asbestos fibers.18  Because an important feature of 
nanoparticles is their comparatively large surface area to mass ratio, some scientists also 
believe that they may be significantly more toxic per unit of mass than larger particles of the 
same chemical.19  Indeed, some scientists maintain that the nanoscale itself may entail toxic 
characteristics, irrespective of the particular chemical makeup of any nanomaterial that is 
confronted by a human subject.20   
Although the number of studies addressing potential adverse health and 
environmental effects of nanomaterials has increased significantly in recent years as 
governments have begun to direct a larger share of public research support to such 
questions, the area remains riddled with uncertainty.21  Yet, stark though it may be, this 
epistemic vacuum hardly distinguishes nanotechnology from other subjects of 
environmental, health, and safety regulation.  Indeed, a long recognized hallmark feature of 
such regulation has been the informational and cognitive limitations that face any regulator’s 
ability to identify, understand, and predict the consequences of risk-creating activities, 
including the act of regulation itself.22  Accordingly, a critical challenge for risk regulation is 
to ensure that the regulator’s decisionmaking models are appropriately suited to the nature 
                                                 
18 See Katharine Sanderson, Migrating Nanotubes Add to Asbestos Concern, Nature News 
doi:10.1038/news.2009.217 (March 31, 2009), available at 




21 For instance, a British scientific report noted in 20__ that “[t]here is virtually no information 
available about the effect of nanoparticles on species other than humans or about how they behave in the air, 
water or soil, or about their ability to accumulate in food chains.”  Id. at x. 
22 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 124 (2003) 
(noting that “pervasive uncertainties are simply assumed by most scholars to be part of the framework within 
which environmental law must operate”).  Esty believes that developments in information technology and 
other scientific fields will significantly reduce environmental uncertainty and increase the likelihood of 
regulatory efficacy.  As noted infra text accompanying notes __-__, however, some degree of uncertainty is 
likely to plague environmental decisionmaking irrespective of scientific progress, given the nature of complex 
adaptive systems. 
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and degree of uncertainty faced, whether the models concern the assessment of ecological or 
human health hazards, the calculation of economic costs, or some more ambitious 
integration of the two. 
 
Biophysical Systems.  As J.B. Ruhl has observed, advances in ecological science 
have made a “mess” of thinking about environmental law and policy.23  The romantic notion 
that nature can be preserved in a stable equilibrium untouched by human influence has long 
since been discredited, not merely by improved theoretical understanding of the inherent 
dynamism and disorder of ecosystems,24 but also by increasing awareness of the fundamental 
interconnectedness between ecosystems and other complex adaptive systems, including 
especially those that are associated with human activity.25  To take only the most vivid 
example, greenhouse gases emitted through fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, and other 
human activities have contributed to climatic changes that are occurring on a planetary scale, 
with potential consequences for all life forms in all areas of the globe.26  Moreover, as 
demonstrated by the fact that existing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions will continue 
to affect the atmosphere for decades or even centuries beyond the present one, the desire 
simply to “let nature be” no longer generates meaningful guidance for environmental 
policymaking.  Instead, as Ruhl recently put it, “[t]he reality is that there simply is no way to 
                                                 
23 Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How to Clean up the 
Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997). 
24 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1996); A. 
Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1121 (1994); Fred Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An 
Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 869-879 (1994). 
25 DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES:  A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 188 (1990) (observing that “life and environment are one thing, not two, and people, as all life, are 
immersed in the one system”). 
26 The spread of invasive species represents a human-influenced problem of similarly global 
proportions.  See generally HARMFUL INVASIVE SPECIES:  LEGAL RESPONSES (Marc Miller & Robert Fabian, eds., 
2004). 
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‘preserve’ nature without in some sense managing it somewhere with some kind of human-
defined purpose.”27 
In response to these developments, the concept of “ecosystem management”28 has 
arisen with a goal of “integrat[ing] scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within a 
complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native 
ecosystem integrity over the long term.”29  As conservation biologists and others have 
emphasized, the long-run integrity of ecosystems is important not merely because non-
human life forms within those systems may have some intrinsic value by virtue of their 
existence alone, but also because humanity depends in numerous ways on the “ecosystem 
services” that are provided by well-functioning ecosystems and the shifting web of life forms 
that comprise them.30  Conversely, ecosystem functioning is affected in a multitude of ways 
by the behavior of humans, whose macroscale policies and microscale decisions contribute 
to a state of irrevocable interdependence between social and ecological systems.  
                                                 
27 J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management: A Response to Pardy, 21 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 315 (2004). 
28 See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT (2002).  Ecosystem management relates closely to C.S. Holling’s notion of “adaptive 
management,” from which the newer field derives its basic management principle of continuous monitoring 
and adjustment.  See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).  
See also KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53 (1993) (describing adaptive management as an application 
of “the concept of experimentation to the design and implementation of natural-resource and environmental 
policies”). 
29 R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994).  
See also Norman L. Christensen, The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for 
Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996) (describing ecosystem management as “driven 
by explicit goals, executed by policies, protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research 
based on our best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem 
composition, structure, and function”). 
30 See generally James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr., & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem 
Services:  Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 327 (2001); Robert L. Fischman, The EPA’s 
NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 497 (2001); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for 
Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2000); GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE 
MARKETPLACE: CAPTURING THE VALUE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2000); J.B. Ruhl, Valuing Nature’s Services:  
The Future of Environmental Law?, 13-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 359 (1998); James Salzman, Valuing 
Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 887, 893 (1997); NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON 
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen Daily, ed., 1997). 
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Accordingly, proponents of the ecosystem management paradigm view their task as one of 
identifying, monitoring, and sustaining evolutionary and ecological processes, recognizing 
that those processes occur within a complex of multiple, interconnected systems, including 
political, economic, and other sociolegal systems that help to determine the human impact 
on ecosystems. 
Lurking behind the ecosystem management approach is an ontology informed by the 
teachings of complexity theory.  In pithy terms, complexity theory suggests that researchers 
and regulators should expect the unexpected whenever they examine complex adaptive 
systems such as immune systems, coral reefs, the global climate, the world economy, or even 
a pattern as seemingly mundane and uncomplicated as a dripping faucet.31  Complexity 
theory should be deliberately contrasted with the reductionist focus of the Newtonian 
tradition in science, which attempts to understand the world by breaking it down into 
smaller and smaller components for isolated study.  Although clearly fruitful for a variety of 
tasks, a central tenet of complexity theory is that “the reductionist methodology will never 
lead to a fully predictive theory of any complex system.”32  For instance, researchers may be 
able to identify the dose-response curve that characterizes the acute toxicity effects of a 
given nanomaterial on a given species within the splendor of a controlled laboratory 
environment, but at the same time they may miss entirely the effects of the substance on the 
species in its broader ecological context.  In order to begin to grasp these more dynamic, 
                                                 
31 See Ruhl, supra note __, at 936. 
32 Id. at 937 (citing JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER (1995); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A 
NEW SCIENCE (1987); BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMPLEXITY (1996)). 
Extremely early draft – please do not cite, quote, or reproduce without permission 
 15
slippery effects, complexity theory suggests that researchers must adopt a different “pre-
analytic vision” of the systems that they are attempting to model.33   
The pre-analytic vision of complex adaptive systems differs in a number of 
significant ways from the alternative vision of systems that are comprised by linear, 
independently-operating components.  First, complexity theory presupposes that micro-level 
interactions between numerous forces or agents within a system give rise to patterns of 
behavior that are only detectable when the system is viewed at the macro-level, in its 
entirety.34  The ant or termite colony provides a vivid example, as it exhibits extraordinary 
features such as temperature regulation and geographic orientation that simply cannot be 
predicted or accounted for by examining the behavior of individual colony members alone.35  
Second, complex adaptive systems often exhibit nonlinear relationships and behaviors, such 
that they do not display mathematical proportionality in the tidy manner assumed by classical 
science and mathematics.36  This is not to suggest that the systems are indeterminate, but 
rather that their rules of operation give rise to stunningly complex and difficult-to-predict 
interactions.  Extremely minor, even immeasurable variations in conditions between two 
otherwise identically situated systems – such as the presence in one system of the proverbial 
                                                 
33 As is well recognized by philosophers of science, the choice of pre-analytic vision affects 
fundamentally the nature of the questions that researchers ask and the empirical evidence that they seek.  See 
Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 675 (2003) (“[A]nalytic 
effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic effort 
. . . . [T]his preanalytic cognitive act will be called Vision.”) (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 41 (1954)). 
34 See PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY: THE SEARCH FOR 
ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 7 (1995). 
35 To wit, cylindrical termite mounds found in Northern Australia – constructed and maintained by 
hundreds of thousands of short-lived, sterile worker members – can stretch to 8 meters tall and survive as long 
as 100 years.  The mounds face consistently in a north-south direction such that the sun warms the structure 
during the morning and evening, while only a thin edge is exposed to the heat of the sun during the day.  
Worker termites help to further regulate temperature by opening and closing ventilation chambers, by 
clustering for warmth, and by excavating for cool water droplets, such that the mound system in the aggregate 
is able to maintain its core temperature with remarkable precision year-round.  See J. SCOTT TURNER, THE 
EXTENDED ORGANISM:  THE PHYSIOLOGY OF ANIMAL-BUILT STRUCTURES (2000). 
36 See Ruhl, supra note __, at 946-947. 
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flapping of a butterfly’s wings37 – can give rise to dramatic differences in outcome between 
the two systems only a few evolutionary steps later.  The resulting “chaos” is not 
randomness per se, but rather “order masquerading as randomness,”38 a state of being that, 
although deterministic, nevertheless remains irreducibly uncertain. 
Third, in addition to sensitivity to minor variations in conditions, complex systems 
also are characterized by feedback and feedforward loops, in which system components 
influence other components that, in turn, cause their own effects on the original, as well as 
many other, components within the system.39  Cause and effect pathways, in other words, are 
not terminal and unidirectional.  Instead, the components of a system are interconnected 
through numerous multidirectional paths of relation and dependence.40  This state of 
interconnection often leads to multiplier effects and other self-reinforcing tendencies that 
render a system’s condition at any given time path dependent and, therefore, not easily 
reversed or altered.41  For example, if researchers discover that release of a nonparticle into a 
particular habitat destroys zooplankton and leads to a proliferation of algae, which in turn 
promotes the expansion of a particular amphibian species, it will be impossible for even the 
most skilled ecosystem manager to restore the original “equilibrium” that once characterized 
                                                 
37 See GLEICK, supra note __, at 20-23. 
38 Id. at 22. 
39 See id. at 947-948. 
40 For instance, one classic example of ripple effects from ecology concerned a decline in the 
availability of forage fish near Alaska’s Aleutian archipelago, which caused a decrease in the population of seals 
and sea lions (a dietary staple of killer whales), which caused killer whales to shift their diet to sea otters, which 
caused an increase in the population of sea urchins (a dietary staple of sea otters), which finally in turn caused a 
sharp decrease in kelp forests (a dietary staple of sea urchins).  See J. A. Estes et al., Killer Whale Predation on Sea 
Otters Linking Oceanic and Nearshore Ecosystems, 282 SCI. 473 (1998) 
41 See Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606-622 (2001) (surveying variations of path dependence theory). 
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the habitat.  Instead, the system will only be able to continue adapting in some manner or 
another from its present, path-dependent state.42 
Finally, an important consequence of these various features of complex adaptive 
systems is that normal or Gaussian probability theory may be highly misleading when used 
to predict or describe their behavior.  As Farber has discussed, “[c]omplex systems . . . are 
often characterized by a different kind of statistical distribution called a ‘power law.’”43  
Systems that are subject to power laws display a number of peculiar features.  Most notably, 
they typically have “fat tails,”44 in which large or even extreme events appear with a regularity 
that would be unthinkable from the perspective of normal probability assumptions.  Indeed, 
as Farber notes, “it is possible for a variable subject to a power law to have an infinite 
variance or even an infinite expected value.”45  In light of their fat tails, large or infinite 
variances, and other non-Gaussian features, systems governed by power laws are not 
adequately described by conventional statistical concepts such as the mean or the mode.  
Indeed, by focusing only on average outcomes in the conventional manner, analysts of 
complex adaptive systems risk ignoring important – even potentially catastrophic – aspects 
of the system’s behavior.  Their mistake, in essence, is to apply a pre-analytic vision of order 
to a system of chaos.  As two pioneering thinkers in the ecosystem management field have 
written, “in no place can we claim to predict with certainty either the ecological effects of the 
activities, or the efficacy of most measures aimed at regulating or enhancing them.  Every 
major change in harvesting rates and management practices is in fact a perturbation 
                                                 
42 Hence, the new paradigm of “non-equilibrium ecology.”  See Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note __, at 
__. 
43 Farber, supra note __, at 146-147. 
44 Id. at 155. 
45 Id. 
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experiment with highly uncertain outcome, no matter how skillful the management agency is 
in marshalling evidence and arguments in support of the change.”46 
 
 Sociolegal Systems.  The process of Darwinian evolution has long provided the 
leading metaphorical explanation for the operation of economic markets.47  Naturally, then, 
as our vision of biophysical systems and evolutionary processes sharpens to include 
complexity and dynamism as foundational characteristics, so too might our understanding of 
market operations evolve to embrace such characteristics.  Recently, a number of theorists 
have begun to mine the field of complexity theory for insight into economics in precisely 
this manner.48  Their findings include nonlinear discontinuities in price dynamics, extreme 
sensitivity over time to minor variations in conditions, powerful feedback loops that 
contribute to bubbles and other extreme economic events, and many other hallmark features 
of complex adaptive systems.  Mathematician Benoit Mandlebrot, an important intellectual 
figure in the development of fractal geometry and complexity theory, expects these initial 
findings to lead in time to nothing short of a revolution in the theory of economics and 
finance.  He argues that, at bottom, “[t]he geometry that describes the shape of coastlines 
and the patterns of galaxies also elucidates how stock prices soar and plummet.”49 
 It is too early to tell whether Mandlebrot’s vision of a revolutionized economic 
theory will come to fruition, although the global economic collapse that began in late 2009 
                                                 
46 C. Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning By Doing, 71 
Ecology 2060 (1990). 
47 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 642 (1996) 
(referring to the “paradigm of a Darwinian survival of the fittest in law and economics”). 
48 See BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS (2004); 
EDGAR E. PETERS, CHAOS AND ORDER IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS : A NEW VIEW OF CYCLES, PRICES, AND 
MARKET VOLATILITY (1996); EDGAR E. PETERS, FRACTAL MARKET ANALYSIS: APPLYING CHAOS THEORY TO 
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMICC (1994); J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics, 
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (Fall 1999); Roe, supra note __. 
49 Benoit B. Mandelbrot, A Multifractal Walk Down Wall Street, SCI. AM., February, 1999. 
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has certainly strengthened the case for inclusion of greater systemic analysis of market 
behavior and greater levels of humility regarding the power of positivistic financial modeling.  
Even before those events, however, one already could identify traces of complexity theory in 
much of prevailing thought about markets and regulation.  An important theme of the risk 
reform debate, for instance, has been repeated emphasis on the possibility of “unintended 
consequences” from regulation.50  Just as ecosystems are believed to be characterized by 
pronounced and often unpredictable changes due to minor perturbations, markets are said to 
exhibit “substitution effects,”51 “compensating behaviors,”52 and a host of other 
unanticipated results that flow from government regulatory interventions.  For instance, in 
one classic example, economist Sam Peltzman argues that highway safety regulations such as 
mandatory seatbelt laws may lead drivers to reduce their own level of caution, generating an 
accident rate that is higher overall than without the regulation.53  Similarly, Kip Viscusi 
contends that child-proof container requirements for medicines may give parents a false 
                                                 
50 For a critical overview, see Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988). 
51 See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1775 (2002) (“Sometimes a regulation will 
bring about a risk tradeoff when it effects a shift from one product or process to another, which in turn gives 
rise to risks of its own.”). 
52 See Peter A. Veytsman, Drug Testing Student Athletes and Fourth Amendment Privacy: The Legal Aftermath 
of Veronica v. Action, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 295, 325 (2000) (referring to “the theory of compensating behavior, 
in which people’s responses to government regulations are often contrary to the intended effect of the 
regulation”).  See also BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE 
OF THE WORLD 10 (2001) (arguing that “scrapping pesticides would actually result in more cases of cancer 
because fruits and vegetables help to prevent cancer, and without pesticides fruits and vegetables would get 
more expensive, so that people would eat less of them”); William N. Evans & Matthew C. Farrelly, The 
Compensating Behavior of Smokers: Taxes, Tar, and Nicotine, 29 RAND J. ECON. 578 (1998) (concluding that higher 
cigarette taxes may lead some smokers to consume higher tar and higher nicotine cigarettes, thereby 
counteracting the health benefits that governments hoped to achieve from lower consumer demand 
attributable to the higher product price). 
53 See Sam Peltzman, The Regulation of Auto Safety, in AUTO SAFETY REGULATION: THE CURE OR THE 
PROBLEM? 2-3 (Henry G. Manne & Roger LeRoy Miller eds., 1976). 
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sense of security, prompting them to leave drugs within reach of children and leading 
ultimately to more children at risk than before the requirements were imposed.54 
 This “law of unintended consequences”55 also find expression within the context of 
environmental regulation, where commentators often cite failed attempts by government 
officials to limit fishery harvesting as a particularly telling example.  Jonathan Adler provides 
a succinct summary of this tragicomical tale: 
It is now generally accepted that traditional regulatory approaches to fishery 
conservation have been a spectacular failure.  Regulatory controls have 
typically taken the form of limits on fishing seasons, boat size, fishing areas, 
equipment and the like. . . .  However well-intentioned, such rules often lead 
to absurd results.   License controls and other entry restrictions may limit the 
number of fishers, but they do not control the amount or intensity of fishing 
efforts.  Mandates on the type of equipment that can be used, an effort to 
control total catch by mandating that fishers use less-efficient means of 
catching fish, encourage fishers to increase their investment in additional 
vessels or gear to compensate for the efficiency losses.  Limits on the 
number of days fished encourage fishers to increase their effort on those 
days allowed.  The results are rampant overcapitalization in fisheries and a 
destructive “derby” system in which each fisher races to catch as much as he 
or she can before the season closes.56 
 
In short, the regulator’s attempt to manage fishery harvesting levels through governmental 
controls is thwarted at each stage by unanticipated counter-adjustments and other reactive 
processes within the commercial fishing market.  The lesson of the tale is familiar: The 
regulator assumes linearity and predictability when, in fact, the system being regulated is 
complex. 
                                                 
54 See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK  234-
242 (1992).  Viscusi refers more broadly to a “lulling effect,” whereby the introduction of government safety 
regulations “produce[s] misperceptions that lead consumers to reduce their safety precautions because they 
overestimate the product’s safety.”  Id. at 225.  See also W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of 
Product Safety Regulations, 28 J.L. & ECON. 527, 537-46 (1985). 
55 See Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 227 (2003) (noting that “the law of 
unintended consequences” often is invoked to suggest that “imperfect markets might be preferable to 
imperfect regulations”). 
56 Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAM UNIV. L. 
REV. 9, 15 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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 Compensating behaviors are but one way in which government risk regulations are 
thought to entail subtle, but significant secondary effects.  Other claimed “risk tradeoffs”57 
of environmental, health, and safety regulation include direct or “iatrogenic” effects such as 
the possibility that “cleaning up Superfund sites, or removing asbestos from buildings, may 
put workers at risk of exposure and occupational injury”58; and “health-health tradeoffs” 
such as the increased mortality and morbidity that is said to flow merely from the act of 
expending money on regulatory compliance.59  In light of these various tradeoffs, scholars 
have advocated “risk-risk analysis”60 as a mechanism for focusing decisionmakers on all of 
the negative effects that may be expected to come from adopting a particular environmental, 
health, or safety standard.  Such comprehensive risk analysis is thought to be desirable 
because the adaptive behaviors and activities of market participants evade casual prediction: 
                                                 
57 John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK V. RISK:  TRADEOFFS 
IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., 1995). 
58 Jonathan Baert Weiner, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY, & 
ENV. 39, 40 (1998).  According to Weiner, such “countervailing risks” caused or increased by regulation are 
“ubiquitous.”  Id. 
59 The argument is not as specious as it initially sounds.  Proponents of health-health analysis cite the 
consistent and significant correlation that has been found between individual and family income and health, 
particularly as measured by longevity.  See, e.g.,  W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 
1452-1453 (1996); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis:  A New Way to Evaluate Health 
and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 44 (1993) (“Health-health analysis seeks to quantify the 
expected declines in health and safety that may be ascribed to the costs of complying with a regulation.”); see 
also Randall Lutter, John Morrall, & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 
37 ECON. INQ. 599 (1999); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 
22 ECOL. L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. RISK & 
UNCERT. 95 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. 
RISK & UNCERT. 19 (1994).  In light of this correlation, supporters argue that any regulation will entail adverse 
health consequences, so long as compliance with the regulation requires a reduction in income: “regulatory 
expenditures represent opportunity costs to society that divert resources from other uses.  These funds could 
have provided for greater healthcare, food, housing, and other goods and services that promote individual 
longevity.”  Id. at 1452.  Even supporters of health-health analysis, however, acknowledge that the identified 
statistical correlation between income and health is far from a demonstration of causation.  See id. at 1455.  
Accordingly, the argument linking regulatory expenditures with reduced health depends at its core upon little 
more than faith in a series of counterfactual assumptions about the opportunity costs of regulation. 
60 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002); MARGOLIS, supra note __; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 212 (1988); Chauncey Starr & 
Christopher Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, 208 SCI. 1114 (1980).  Unlike many other writers in the risk-risk 
analysis field, Wiener is careful to distinguish the so-called “wealthier is healthier” effect from other 
“countervailing risks” of regulation.  See Wiener, supra note __, at 53. 
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As the story of hapless fishery management indicates, failure to rigorously cast about in 
search of unintended consequences before acting may lead regulators to govern ineffectively 
or, indeed, to cause harm where they intend good. 
 To date, critics of risk regulation have successfully highlighted the notion that 
government actions within market environments may cause unanticipated effects that work 
at cross purposes with the goal of government action.  Less well appreciated, however, has 
been the fact that regulations also can entail unintended consequences that are beneficial.61  
Researchers studying climate change mitigation policies, for instance, have calculated that the 
“ancillary benefits” of greenhouse gas mitigation – such as the incidental reduction of other 
harmful air pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and 
particulates) – may be as high as $20 per ton of emissions reduced in 1990 U.S. dollars, an 
amount that is comparable in magnitude to estimates of the direct benefits of climate change 
policies.62  As Samuel Rascoff and Richard Revesz have argued, similar “ancillary benefits 
have been observed across a broad range of contexts.”63  Because the debate over regulatory 
reform has tended to ignore this reality, however, “[t]he resulting legal and scholarly 
conclusions about the desirability of regulation [have been] consistently distorted.”64 
The overlooked phenomenon of ancillary benefits suggests that the interaction 
between government regulation and markets is more complex than even members of the 
unintended consequences school tend to appreciate.  To complicate matters still further, 
once the analyst decides to include substitution effects or other endogenous behavioral 
                                                 
61 See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note __, at 1791 (“Advocates of risk tradeoff analysis, while aspiring to 
a more ‘holistic’ approach to regulation, consistently ignore the possibility that regulatory interventions will 
produce ancillary benefits and not merely ancillary harms.”). 
62 See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg’s 
The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 223, __ (2003). 
63 Rascoff & Revesz, supra note __, at 1766.   
64 Id. See also Richard Revesz & Michael Livermore, Retaking Rationality. 
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responses to regulation, then it is not a large theoretical step to admit that endogenous shifts 
may also occur with respect to preferences.65  Contrary to the standard assumption of many 
schools of policy analysis, markets and other sociolegal systems are not characterized by 
linear, unidirectional relationships between public values and the law, on the one hand, and 
the law and its subjects, on the other.  Rather, the system of relationships among these 
forces exhibits feedback loops, oscillations, and other characteristic traits of complex 
adaptive systems, including a state of reciprocal influence between the law and public values.  
Thus, just as legal policies may affect behavior in complex and unanticipated ways, so too 
may policies alter the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, including perhaps the very beliefs 
and attitudes that initially justify a policy choice.  As Cass Sunstein has noted, these 
“preference-shaping effects of legal rules cast doubt on the idea that . . . regulation should 
attempt to satisfy or follow some aggregation of private preferences . . . .  When preferences 
are a function of legal rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences.”66 
Unintended consequences, ancillary benefits, and endogenous preferences all reflect 
an important truism identified nearly one half century ago by two economists in a classic 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993). 
66 Id. at 234-235.  See also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175, 178 (2003) (noting that “[w]hat people choose often depends on the starting point, and hence the 
starting point cannot be selected by asking what people choose,” and that, at times, this “problem of circularity 
dooms the market-mimicking approach”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKET AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) 
(“[W]hen preferences are a function of legal rules, the government cannot take preferences as given [and] the 
rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences . . . .”).  Cf. Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences:  The 
Cultural Consequences of Markets and other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 75 (1998) (describing 
conceptual problems created for economic theory when markets “influence the evolution of values, tastes, and 
personalities”). 
Still further complications arise from the fact that government rules, regulations, and requirements 
may themselves interact and behave as a complex adaptive system, a point that J. B. Ruhl has urged in several 
articles.  See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the 
Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757 (2003); Ruhl, supra note __; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the 
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 
DUKE L. J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using 
Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997).  See also Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex 
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 192 (1996). 
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article entitled “The General Theory of the Second Best.”67  In this article, the theorists 
formally demonstrated that the alleviation of one distortion among many in a given market 
may not necessarily lead to an overall increase in the efficiency of the market.  For instance, 
at any given time, a particular microeconomic inefficiency may be serving to counteract the 
effects of another inefficiency such that, if the former were eliminated, society would 
become worse off in the aggregate, not better.  Stated more precisely, “if one or more 
members of a set of optimal conditions cannot be fulfilled, there is no general reason to 
believe that fulfilling (or more closely approximating) more of the remaining conditions will 
bring [society] closer to the optimum than fulfilling fewer of the remaining conditions.”68  
The macroeconomic efficiency problem, in that sense, is ill-posed:  Many of its determining 
variables and rules of interrelationship are simply unknown, such that the impact that one or 
more microeconomic adjustments will have on the system as a whole remains shrouded in 
deep uncertainty. 
Although not expressly premised on complexity theory, the General Theory of the 
Second Best shares much of that theory’s pre-analytic vision.  The Theory notes at its heart 
that the factors determining a macroeconomic equilibrium are so numerous, multifaceted, 
and interdependent that one simply cannot know whether a microeconomic efficiency 
improvement will lead, on net, to an improvement at the macroeconomic scale, unless one 
assumes – contrary to all available evidence –  that the microeconomic inefficiency under 
investigation is the only such inefficiency in the entire system.69  Participants in the risk 
                                                 
67 See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 
(1956). 
68 Richard S. Markovits, Second Best Theory and Law and Economics: An Introduction, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
3, 3 (1998). 
69 Thus, as Duncan Kennedy put it, “[t]here is no reason to believe that summing a series of valid 
partial equilibrium exercises will yield a valid general equilibrium solution.”  Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law 
in Economic Thought: Articles on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 939, 963 (1985). 
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regulation debate exhibit some sensitivity to this complexity by examining policy proposals 
with an awareness that market inefficiencies other than the target of the proposal may exist 
and may impact the outcomes of government intervention.  For instance, analysts forego the 
unrealistic assumption that users of child-proof medicine containers are perfectly rational, 
and instead investigate empirically supported cognitive tendencies that lead them to predict a 
counterintuitive, and counterproductive, parental response.  Similarly, rather than assume an 
absence of additional pollution externalities when evaluating the costs and benefits of 
climate change policies, analysts instead examine the actual evidence and discover that a host 
of harmful air pollution effects currently exist that serendipitously would be alleviated by 
climate change mitigation.  In both cases, by attempting to model the welfare consequences 
of regulation in a highly interactive – and imperfect – world, the policy analyst demonstrates 
at least partial awareness of the complexity of sociolegal systems. 
 
II.  Uncertainty and Complexity in the Mind 
In addition to the external environments they aim to influence, risk regulators also 
must grapple with problems of uncertainty and complexity within the mind itself, as even 
well-behaved, well-understood systems will confound the regulator whose judgment is 
influenced by psychological tendencies that conflict with the realization of a regulatory 
goal.70  Within cognitive psychology, a theoretical debate has raged for the last two decades 
over whether and when heuristic decisionmaking approaches provide superior results to 
more analytically formalized procedures.71  Psychologists participating in what has been 
called the heuristics research tradition claim that individuals often are wise to ignore 
                                                 
70 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002). 
71 Phillip Tetlock, & B. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCH. SCI. 94 (2002). 
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available, relevant information and to eschew purposeful attempts to calculate an optimal 
result in their personal judgment and decisionmaking.72  According to these theorists, relying 
instead on heuristic techniques that exploit informational cues and other features of the 
decisionmaking environment can conserve scarce computational effort while achieving a 
performance level that approaches the results of deliberate optimization techniques.  
Moreover, they argue that, in many instances, heuristics provide the only “ecologically 
rational” manner in which to solve problems given that many, if not most, real world 
problems are not posed in a manner that permits the identification of an optimal solution, let 
alone its attainment.73 
 In contrast to these psychologists, the heuristics and biases research program 
pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky74 has become associated with the view 
that individual decisionmaking heuristics frequently are unreliable and that “corrective” 
measures such as debiasing efforts or legal interventions are necessary in order to better 
approximate the ideal of expected utility maximization.75  Although at times confused and 
overblown,76 the contrast between these two viewpoints is nevertheless instructive for the 
present Article because it parallels in many ways the debate that has taken place between 
proponents of CBA and supporters of the PP within environmental law and policy.  
Moreover, in recent years, participants in theoretical debates over the PP and risk regulation 
                                                 
72 See GERD GIGERENZER & PETER TODD, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 25-26 (1999) 
(describing decisionmaking heuristics as “useful, even indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems 
that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory”). 
73 See id. at vii (arguing that simple cognitive heuristics persist because “they are ecologically rational, 
that is, adapted to the structure of the information in the environment in which they are used to make 
decisions”). 
74 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 
1124 (1974) (identifying decisionmaking heuristics as “principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” and which “are quite useful, but 
sometimes . . . lead to severe and systematic errors”). 
75 For leadings statements, see Sunstein; Sunstein & Jolls. 
76 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 2005. 
Extremely early draft – please do not cite, quote, or reproduce without permission 
 27
more generally have begun to turn to cognitive psychology and behavioural decision theory 
for insight and support of their policy recommendations.  To these theorists, psychological 
findings offer the potential not only to produce more reliable predictions of behaviour 
among individuals and other actors that the law is attempting to influence, but also to 
provide guidance for shaping the content and structure of legal rules themselves, so that they 
may better resonate with what we know about the human mind. 
 
Rationality in Individual Choice.77  Within decision theory and cognitive 
psychology, one tends to encounter both optimality-based and heuristic-based models of 
how the human mind accesses and processes information.  The former category of models 
encompass fully specified analytic systems in which the processes of decisionmaking are 
given by formal rules of logic and computation that can be described with mathematical 
precision, replicated over multiple trials, and extended across diverse tasks.  Optimality-
based approaches derive generally from rational choice theory and seek to identify the 
solution or solutions to a problem that are singularly optimal according to a desired criterion, 
such as expected utility maximization or wealth maximization.  Optimization models can be 
prescriptive, in the sense that they aim to identify the solution that individuals or other 
decisionmakers should adopt for a given problem, or they can be simply descriptive, in the 
sense that they aim to predict the choices that decisionmakers will adopt for a given 
problem.  Descriptive models may be further subdivided according to whether they purport 
to describe the actual processes that decisionmakers utilize in order to solve problems, or 
whether they instead merely aim to predict the outcomes of decisions, while remaining 
                                                 
77 This section draws on Douglas A. Kysar et al., Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?, in HEURISTICS 
AND THE LAW (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, eds., forthcoming M.I.T. Press, 2005). 
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agnostic on the particular cognitive processes that individuals employ in order to produce 
such outcomes. 
Heuristics researchers in contrast seek to model and understand directly the 
cognitive processes that individuals use to make decisions.  Such researchers differ, however, 
in the extent to which they believe that heuristic models supplement, as opposed to 
supplant, optimization models.  The heuristics and biases research program, for instance, has 
used experimentally observed departures from rational choice theory to glean insights about 
the mental processes that individuals utilize when evaluating options and making decisions.  
Accordingly, many view the heuristics and biases program as leading naturally to a “repair 
model” research agenda, in which heuristics are thought to offer exceptions or additions to 
the basic theoretical engine of decisionmaking which remains premised fundamentally on 
expected utility maximization.  The heuristics program, on the other hand, seeks to 
understand decisionmaking from the “bottom up,” by identifying and modeling the actual 
cognitive processes that individuals are believed to use for given decisionmaking tasks and 
without regard to any basic underlying model of rational choice.  Obviously, this level of 
ambition in the heuristics research agenda carries a likelihood that the program will for some 
time appear incomplete to theorists who are accustomed to the parsimonious scalability of 
rational choice theory. 
Nevertheless, one important reason that researchers in the heuristics program seek to 
build a new decisionmaking model from the bottom up stems from their belief that 
optimization models offer limited applicability to many real world problems.  Specifically, in 
two different manners, decisionmaking problems may be intractable in the sense that no 
optimal solution can be identified by any presently available optimization model, let alone 
attained.  First, many goals when specified mathematically take the form of “ill-posed” 
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problems; that is, problems that cannot in principle be solved.  In this category fall those 
problems with unknown, vague, or incalculable criteria, and those problems for which an 
adequate weighting function among criteria cannot be specified.  Second, many of the 
remaining problems that are well-posed are nevertheless computationally intractable.  In this 
category fall those problems that are formally NP-hard – that is, intrinsically harder than the 
category of problems that can be solved in nondeterministic polynomial time – and those 
problems that are otherwise practically insoluble given the limits of currently available 
information technology. 
According to researchers in the heuristics tradition, the fact that many problems 
cannot be solved with traditional optimization-based techniques has both descriptive and 
prescriptive implications.  Descriptively, it raises a further challenge – in addition to the 
challenge presented by the behavioral findings of the heuristics and biases research 
program78 – to the notion that individual judgment and decisionmaking can best be 
predicted by a model of expected utility maximization.  The fact that humans face many 
problems that do not admit of optimal solutions has made it adaptively desirable over time 
that humans not seek to replicate optimization-based systems in their cognition, at least not 
universally.  Similarly, in competitive environments, it often is desirable for human subjects 
to exhibit some degree of “irreducible uncertainty” in their behavior in order to evade 
precise anticipation by their opponents.79  It is not surprising, therefore, that rational choice 
theory has proven unable to accommodate a wide range of stable individual behaviors:  Such 
behaviors have evolved in response to decisionmaking environments that often do not 
themselves conform to the presuppositions of rational choice theory. 
                                                 
78 For an overview of these findings, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of 
Economic Theory and Legal Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY (Paul Slovic, ed., 2001). 
79 PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF 
NEUROECONOMICS (2004). 
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Prescriptively, the existence of ill-posed and computationally intractable problems 
also disrupts the claim of optimization-based regimes to comprehensive application.  Due to 
the existence of these types of problems, the limit of the solution frontier for a 
decisionmaking task in many cases will not be given by rational choice theory or any other 
available optimization system.  Thus, unless one arbitrarily excludes relevant variables or 
otherwise “edits” the problem in order to yield an optimum solution, some normative 
benchmark other than conventional rational choice ideals will be necessary in these cases in 
order to assess the usefulness of decisionmaking techniques.  Along these lines, researchers 
from the heuristics program argue that decisionmaking heuristics generally perform quite 
well if evaluated according to the criterion of ecological rationality; that is, the fitness of the 
heuristics for the environment in which they are being deployed, as judged by their relative 
success at achieving intended aims compared to other realistically possible decisionmaking 
strategies.80 
 
Rationality in Social Choice.  The two dominant paradigms for environmental 
decisionmaking – CBA and the PP – nicely parallel the two conceptions of rational 
decisionmaking that compete for acceptance within cognitive psychology.  In both debates, a 
sharp contrast has been drawn between decisionmaking techniques that aim, on the one 
hand, to pursue optimal outcomes through the application of formal analytical systems and, 
on the other hand, to achieve realistically satisfactory outcomes through less formalized, 
                                                 
80 Indeed, heuristics researchers argue that a variety of cognitive processes identified in the literature 
as biases or illusions appear well-adapted when viewed within the richer ecological context that shaped their 
development, rather than against a rational choice benchmark that is artificially divorced from many of the 
constraints that characterize real world decisionmaking.  See Gerd, Gigerenzer, Fast and Frugal Heuristics:  The 
Tools of Bounded Rationality, in HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING tbl. 4.1 (D. Koehler & N. 
Harvey, eds., 2004). 
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more incremental decisionmaking processes.  The former “synoptic paradigm”81 is reflected 
both in the expected utility maximization model of rational choice theory and in the applied 
welfare economic technique of regulatory CBA.  Similarly, the latter paradigm of “muddling 
through”82 is reflected both in the “ecological rationality” view of decisionmaking heuristics 
championed by Gigerenzer and others, and in the centuries-old emphasis on foresight and 
anticipatory care that grounds the PP.83 
Legal academic treatment of CBA and the PP has likewise tended to parallel the 
theoretical debate that has taken place within psychology.  A few prominent holdouts aside, 
most scholars writing in the areas of environmental, health, and safety regulation today 
support the view that CBA is a desirable societal decisionmaking tool that outperforms any 
other available framework.  Moreover, these thinkers often cite evidence from the heuristics 
and biases literature in support of their claim that CBA serves to discipline and improve 
collective judgment.  Accepting the common interpretation of the heuristics and biases 
literature that human cognition is prone to systematic error, they argue that CBA helps to 
overcome such errors by forcing comprehensive, empirical evaluation of policy proposals, 
including the hazards that a proposal is designed to address, the proposal’s expected 
behavioural and environmental consequences, and the financial expenditures and foregone 
opportunities that the proposal’s enactment will entail.84 
                                                 
81 Diver, supra note __, at __. 
82 Lindblom, supra note __, at  
83 See Introduction: To Foresee and To Forestall, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1, 4 (1999) (noting that the PP “has its 
roots in hundreds of years of public health practice”); Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in 
Germany—Enabling Government, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31, 38 (Timothy O’Riordan 
& James Cameron eds., 1994) (tracing the PP to the German principle of Vorsoge which means “beforehand or 
prior care and worry”). 
84 See, e.g., Sunstein, Cognition and CBA, supra note __, at __ (describing “[t]he cognitive argument for 
cost-benefit analysis” as premised on the likelihood that “predictable features of cognition will lead to a 
demand for regulation that is unlikely to be based on the facts”). 
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The debate over CBA and the PP can benefit greatly from a broader reading of the 
psychological literature.  Just as supporters of the PP seem to give insufficient regard to the 
possibility that public demand for regulation may be ill-informed or irrational,85 proponents 
of CBA fail to confront the possibility that their maximizing exercise may in some instances 
fail the test of ecological rationality.  As the lessons of the heuristics research program 
suggest, the aspiration to optimize that lies at the heart of CBA may make little practical 
sense when applied to a world of complexity.  To be sure, an important component of the 
argument in favor of CBA is that, without disciplined quantification, ordinary individuals are 
prone to ignore the costs and benefits of decisions that appear “off-screen.”86  The threat of 
genetically modified “super weeds”87 looms large, as do the dangers of catastrophic climate 
change88 or runaway nanodevices that transform the planet into “gray goo.”89  Less visible, 
and therefore less attended to according to proponents of the synoptic paradigm, are the 
vitamin enriched rice strains,90 the carbon fueled economic gains,91 and the nanoscale cancer 
cures92 that might be foregone if society were to abstain from pursuing novel technologies 
                                                 
85 Kuran & Sunstein. 
86 HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK:  WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 76 (1996).  See also Howard Margolis, A New Account of Expert/Lay Conflicts of Risk 
Intuition, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 115 (1997). 
87 See Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note __, at __ (describing biological evidence of genetic trait 
dispersion among neighboring plants from genetically modified crops). 
88 See Kysar, Climate Change, supra note __, at __ (describing “abrupt climate change scenarios”). 
89 See Joy, supra note __, at __ (“Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become 
known as the ‘gray goo problem.’  Though masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, the 
term ‘gray goo’ emphasizes that replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single species of 
crabgrass.  They might be superior in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them valuable.”). 
90 See Adler, supra note __, at 200 (describing “the creation of a new strain of rice fortified with 
additional Vitamin A” that may combat “vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness and other ills, [and 
which] affects up to 250 million children worldwide”). 
91 See LOMBORG, supra note __, at 318 (“Despite our intuition that we naturally need to do something 
drastic . . . about global warming, economic analyses clearly show that it would be far more expensive to cut 
CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased temperatures.”). 
92 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
179, 186 (2003) (speculating that “specially designed nanodevices, the size of bacteria, might be programmed to 
destroy arterial plaque, or fight cancer cells, or repair cellular damage caused by aging”). 
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and other risky endeavors.  CBA forces such “opportunity benefits”93 on-screen by requiring 
the regulator to analyze all identifiable effects of a proposed course of action, including the 
various positive courses of action that might be foreclosed by government regulation.  As 
such, CBA promises to systematize decisionmaking in the administrative state, reducing the 
chance that officials will overlook any potential consequence of government action, whether 
beneficial or harmful.94 
Even assuming that the proper goal of risk regulation is social welfare maximization 
and that existing techniques for valuing costs and benefits do provide “a workable proxy for 
the criterion of overall well-being,”95 the CBA practitioner still must be confident that her 
tools of risk assessment generate reliable data regarding the human and ecological toll 
threatened by a proposed activity or substance.  In this respect, it is a common criticism of 
CBA that the methodology presumes, by its very nature, a level of data and understanding 
regarding the consequences of risk-generating activities that generally is non-existent.  
Moreover, by providing a semblance of order and exactitude where none exists, the results 
of CBA threaten to obscure the actual severity of uncertainties regarding many 
environmental, health, and safety risks.  In light of such concerns, even proponents of the 
methodology counsel against “the thought that science and economics, taken together, can 
produce bottom lines to be mechanically applied by regulatory agencies.”96  The teachings of 
complexity theory, however, suggest that the uncertainty critique strikes more deeply than 
                                                 
93 Sunstein, Precautions Against What?, supra note __, at 9. 
94 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note __, at ix (arguing that, rather than an attempt to maximize 
overall well-being, “cost-benefit analysis should be seen as a simple pragmatic tool, designed to promote better 
appreciation of the consequences of regulation”). 
95 Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 1293, 1393 (2003). 
96 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note __, at 154. 
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this:  It is not merely that CBA may lead to erroneous results, but that it may lead to 
spectacularly erroneous results. 
Unlike many longstanding criticisms of the CBA methodology, this critique cannot 
be dismissed as striking from outside of the welfarist framework that is presupposed by the 
economic reform movement.  Instead, if the teachings of complexity theory are sound, then 
environmental, health, and safety dilemmas will, almost by definition, present ill-posed 
problems that contain “nasty surprises”97 and other intractable features.  In such contexts, 
the deliberate attempt to optimize may not represent simply an imperfect but useful aid to 
decisionmaking, as CBA defenders often assert.98  Rather, it may represent a solution 
concept that is fundamentally ill-suited to the problem tasks at hand.  Because of this misfit, 
we cannot confidently expect that the errors of CBA will cluster around an “optimal” result 
– indeed, for ill-posed problems the very notion of an optimum eludes meaningful 
description.  Instead, we must anticipate that the errors of CBA are capable of deviating 
substantially and unpredictably from decision paths that are easily recognized as desirable, if 
not necessarily optimal, through less formalistic decision procedures.  To give one pressing 
example, future generations may regard with marvel our present day attempts to 
meticulously calculate the costs and benefits of anthropogenic climate change.  Such studies 
often lead to a conclusion that the economic benefits of continued fossil fuel consumption 
more than outweigh the physical, agricultural, and ecological costs that would be averted by 
restricting emissions, at least in the near term.  Accordingly, the optimal greenhouse gas 
reduction policy under CBA is typically a rather limited one that should not commence for 
                                                 
97 Farber, supra note __, at __. 
98 See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Duncan’s Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal 
Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (1984) (calling it a “fundamental error” to assume “that proponents 
of cost-benefit analysis are committed to arguing that the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis ought to be the 
sole criterion used to determine who should be given the relevant legal entitlement”). 
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several decades.99  The important lesson from complexity theory, again, is that the CBA 
consensus on climate change may not merely be wrong; it may be wildly wrong.  Moreover, 
it may be wrong as a matter of consequentialist evaluation, the very domain in which CBA 
proponents proclaim their decisionmaking framework to be most adept.  Truly rational 
regulatory decisionmaking requires some understanding of when it is not optimal to 
optimize.  CBA itself cannot generate such wisdom, for no well-formulated analytical system 
can be expected to derive its own demise.  Instead, what is required in every case is an 
independent judgment – one that is crafted in light of evolving but always incomplete 
knowledge, and that is offered in service of reasoned but always reappraisable moral and 
political commitments. 
The argument from complexity should be distinguished from long-standing 
complaints of scholars that CBA and other formalistic aspects of the regulatory rulemaking 
process can lead to a situation of “paralysis by analysis.”100  This traditional objection to CBA 
– that its enormous informational demands bog down the policymaking process to such a 
degree that, when viewed in light of administrative time and resource constraints, CBA 
becomes pragmatically irrational – might be thought of as mirroring the category of 
informationally and computationally daunting problems that the heuristics research paradigm 
has identified as inappropriate for resolution through optimization procedures.  A second, 
more fundamental objection to CBA, however, is that its subject matter often takes the form 
of ill-posed problems – that is, problems whose imperviousness to resolution is not driven 
by a lack of information or computational capacity, but by features inherent to the problems 
themselves.  Because complex adaptive systems contain irreducible levels of uncertainty that 
                                                 
99 But see Stern; Cline; Weitzman. 
100 Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998). 
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cannot be assumed to be of minor significance, such systems by their nature are likely to 
present ill-posed problems.  In such cases, the heuristics research program of Gigerenzer 
and others advises the adoption of decisionmaking principles far more pragmatic – and more 
overtly normative – than the optimization standard of CBA. 
As proponents of CBA would be quick to point out, however, the non-optimizing 
approach of the PP (and related policy approaches such as best availability technology 
requirements or safe minimum environmental standards) does not come without cost.  Most 
notably, the PP is ill-designed to consider and manage the risks of regulation itself, including 
the risk that cautious regulation may entail significant opportunity costs.  Although one can 
mount a variety of defenses for this apparent asymmetry,101 they are fragile defenses that 
depend at bottom on a wider degree of agreement regarding the need for a fundamental 
value shift from away economic growth and allocative efficiency toward human flourishing 
and environmental sustainability as the basic desiderata of social choice.  Moreover, even if 
one accepts the contention of PP proponents that environmental, health, and safety 
decisionmaking is characterized by deep and abiding uncertainty, it is still far from clear that 
extreme conservatism is appropriate as a general response to uncertainty.  After all, John 
Rawls – whose difference principle fro distributive equity focused attention on the least well-
                                                 
101 In my forthcoming book, see supra note __, I argue that the intended domain of the PP has been 
mischaracterized by its opponents.  Rather than an analytical device that aims to provide specific guidance on 
how to choose and behave in specific policy contexts, the PP is better understood as a moral maxim operating 
at the level of collective agency, akin to the Hippocratic adage – “first, do no harm” – which applies to 
physicians at the individual level.  Like the PP, the Hippocratic adage also appears to be insensitive to the 
opportunity costs of behaving with precaution; for that reason, no physician would unthinkingly follow its 
literal restriction, e.g., by refusing to reset broken bones, inject medicines with painful needles, or undertake 
other harmful treatments in service of a greater therapeutic benefit.  Properly understood, “first, do no harm” 
is not only, or even primarily a behavioral prescription.  It is instead a subtle, but steadfast reminder to the 
professional so cautioned that her actions carry distinctive moral weight and that her patients stand in a position 
of vulnerability and dependency on the careful exercise of her judgment.  It is a reminder most basically to be 
moral.  Similarly, the PP’s requirement that we pause to consider the potentially catastrophic or irreversible 
consequences of our actions is at bottom a reminder that social choices express a collective moral identity.  Our 
identity.  An identity that cannot be located within the freestanding optimization logic of CBA, although we 
need to consider its content more now than perhaps ever before. 
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off member of society, much as the PP and related policy heuristics aim to focus attention 
on the worst-case outcome threatened by environmentally uncertain activities – argued that 
exclusive focus on the worst-case would not be appropriate for determining “how a doctor 
should treat his patients.”102  Proponents of the safe minimum standards approach within 
environmental economics also tend to hedge their positions, arguing that fidelity to safe 
minimum standards should yield when the costs of precaution become “immoderate”103 or 
“unacceptably large.”104  Within the legal literature, Farber similarly allows for departure 
from his strong “environmental baseline” approach to policymaking “when costs would 
clearly overwhelm any potential benefits” from precautionary regulation.105 
Although critics sometimes argue that these various safety valves suggest a latent 
efficiency criterion within the precautionary approach,106 there is an important distinction 
that prevents the PP from collapsing entirely into CBA, even granting the addition of some 
form of cost sensitivity:  The PP’s understanding of cost is much broader than the notion 
presupposed by CBA.  As Richard Bishop wrote in a seminal article on the safe minimum 
standards approach, the determination of “[h]ow much [cost] is ‘unacceptably large’ must 
necessarily involve more than economic analysis, because endangered species involve issues 
of intergenerational equity.”107  Similarly, advocates of the PP typically contemplate an open, 
                                                 
102 John Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 142 (1974). 
103 Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note __, at 252. 
104 R.C. Bishop, Endangered Species and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum Standard, 60 J. AM. 
AG. ECON. 10, 13 (1978).  Bishop clearly incorporates sensitivity to opportunity costs in his temperance of the 
safe minimum standards approach: “To get at total social costs [of implementing the safe minimum standard], 
any measurable benefits of conservation efforts must be subtracted from out-of-pocket and opportunity costs.”  
R.C. Bishop, Endangered Species: An Economic Perspective, cited in Tom W. Crowards, Safe Minimum Standards: Costs 
and Opportunities, 25 ECOL. ECON. 303, 304 (1998). 
105  
106 See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 269 (2001) (“[T]he 
strongest argument for the precautionary principle--that some risks are so huge that they absolutely must not 
be run--becomes meaningless unless we are ready to consider probabilities.”); J. Rolfe, Ulysses Revisited – A 
Closer Look at the Safe Minimum Standard, 39 AUSTRALIAN J. AG. ECON. 55 (1995). 
107  
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pluralistic process for making determinations about when and how to apply the principle, 
suggesting that the decision to relax its dictates might be premised on a wide range of 
appropriate reasons.108  Given the momentous and context-specific ethical implications of 
such determinations, PP proponents are simply unwilling to allow mechanical devices such 
as risk aversion or option value premiums to substitute for considered, democratic judgment.  
The problem, though, is that PP proponents fail to provide adequate substantive guidance as 
to how these various safety valves should be implemented.  Given that society is to avoid 
serious or irreversible harm unless the costs of doing so become “intolerable,” how is the 
notion of intolerability to be understood and operationalized?  The PP raises this question 
and rightly emphasizes that its resolution is far more complicated and value-laden than the 
CBA procedure would indicate.  To date, however, the PP has failed to provide a compelling 
resolution of its own and has instead tended to turn to a richer substantive framework such 
as the sustainability paradigm,109 or simply to equate the results of an idealized democratic 
decisionmaking process with sound policymaking.  In either case, as even its proponents 
acknowledge, “implementation of the [PP] in a consistent and broadly acceptable manner 
has been fraught with philosophical, legal, political, and scientific problems.”110 
 
III.  THE PROMISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSURANCE BONDING 
An agreeable compromise between the extremes of CBA and the PP may be found 
in the form of environmental assurance bonding, a policy tool that has been remarkably 
                                                 
108 See The Wingspread Declaration (“The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must be 
open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected parties.”). 
109 See Michael C. Farmer & Alan Randall, The Rationality of a Safe Minimum Standard, 74 LAND ECON. 
287, 287 (1998) (noting that some “advocates of the precautionary principle expand [safe minimum standard] 
protections into a comprehensive, strong sustainability objective”). 
110 Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, Precautionary Science, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 106, 106.  See also Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule:  
The Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary Principle, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1799 (2003). 
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understudied in the academic and policy literatures, despite the vast increase in attention to 
market-based regulatory instruments over the past three decades.  As this Part explains, the 
environmental assurance bonding approach acknowledges the uncertainty and complexity of 
biophysical systems by attaching serious financial consequence to the causation of 
environmental harm, including even those worst-case harms that can be conceived of as 
theoretically plausible, even though not presently estimable.  The approach also, however, 
acknowledges the strength and dynamism of sociolegal systems by allowing market actors to 
proceed with potentially beneficial activities despite the existence of a credible risk of harm.  
Indeed, the assurance bonding device actively marshals the decentralized decisionmaking 
power of markets as a force for the development of knowledge regarding uncertain 
substances and activities.  As such, the policy tool reflects a high degree of ecological 
rationality, approaching ill-posed regulatory problems with an aggressive combination of 
respect for the power of markets, incentives, and technology, and caution before the 
complexities of nature. 
 
Symmetric Humility.  Before addressing more concrete aspects of the 
environmental assurance bonding device, it is helpful to observe at the theoretical level that 
CBA and the PP suffer from complementary blind spots – blind spots that should be 
recognized as such by partisans in the debate even from within their respective theoretical 
frameworks.  For instance, CBA begins with an assumption that government regulatory 
efforts are especially likely to lead to unintended consequences, lost opportunities, interest 
group distortions, and a variety of other harmful perturbations of the various complex 
systems that comprise the regulated market.  In order to guard against such harms, 
proponents of CBA urge a decisionmaking framework that aspires to comprehensive 
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rationality.  They believe that requiring regulatory choices to be premised on an explicit and 
exhaustive accounting of the choices’ costs and benefits will force government officials to 
more reliably promote the public interest than under less formalized decisionmaking 
procedures. 
The limitation of CBA, however, is that it fails to appreciate the parallel manner in 
which human perturbations of the environment are likely to lead to unintended, 
unpredictable, and potentially harmful outcomes.  Decisionmakers faced with such complex 
and uncertain problems must resort to a more pragmatic and incremental approach to 
policymaking, one that includes criteria for guiding action in the absence of a demonstrable 
optima and that affords flexibility in the face of constantly evolving information regarding 
the need for and the consequences of regulatory action.  CBA instead tends to presume 
static, linear, well-behaved biophysical systems that regulators can model and manage with 
precision.  In essence, proponents of CBA accept the teachings of complexity theory with 
respect to sociolegal systems, but not biophysical systems, a critical shortcoming that casts 
doubt on the belief that CBA is the most ecologically rational approach to environmental, 
health, and safety decisionmaking.111  Importantly, one need not suspend the strictly 
consequentialist-utilitarian philosophical premises of CBA in order to reach this conclusion.  
Rather, the ecological irrationality critique strikes against CBA on the methodology’s own 
terms.  It accuses CBA, in essence, of being insufficiently empirical. 
                                                 
111 Such asymmetry is well-demonstrated by the frequent conclusion of CBA and risk-risk analysis 
proponents that technological interventions provide the most cost-effective manner in which to respond to the 
climate change problem.  See Wiener, Schelling.  Such “geoengineering” interventions – which include cloud-
seeding, ocean carbon sequestration, atmospheric dust dispersion, and a host of other ambitious scenarios – 
reflect an assumption of simplicity and controllability within biophysical systems that proponents of the 
synoptic paradigm would never accept with respect to sociolegal systems.  This asymmetry is especially curious 
given the historical derivation of market metaphors from evolutionary biology.  See supra text accompanying 
note __. 
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The PP, on the other hand, is premised on the bedrock assumption that biophysical 
systems are complex, uncertain, and easily perturbed.  Indeed, much of the confusion in the 
literature regarding the merits of the PP stems from a failure to acknowledge that 
environmental decisionmaking often must precede on the basis of a dauntingly little 
understanding regarding the objects of regulation.  When critics of the PP purport to identify 
harmful consequences of behaving according to the principle’s dictates, they generally 
assume a stable and relatively complete state of knowledge.  Proponents of the PP, on the 
other hand, regard environmental decisionmaking as an inherently uncertain, evolving, and 
dynamic process, and they therefore seek to offer a decisionmaking principle that is 
procedurally rational.  By providing that “[p]reventive action should be taken in advance of 
scientific proof of causality,” and that “the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, 
should bear the burden of proof of safety,”112 the PP incorporates a default assumption of 
harm and surprise from human alteration of biophysical systems, and promotes a structure 
for revising the assumption in light of improved knowledge and changed circumstances. 
The teachings of decision theory and complexity theory suggest that there may be 
much merit to such an approach, even if one’s goal is simply to promote overall utility.  The 
nature of complex adaptive systems counsels an incremental approach to policymaking – 
one that specifically contemplates a state of evolving, yet perpetually incomplete 
information, and that asks its decisionmakers to constantly monitor and adjust policies in 
light of changed circumstances toward identified goals that are themselves subject to 
monitoring and adjustment.  Decisionmakers, in other words, should engage not in 
optimization, but in something closer to the approach that Charles Lindblom famously 
                                                 
112 Introduction: To Foresee and To Forestall, supra note __, at 8-9. 
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termed “muddling through,”113 and that now forms the basis of a significant and well-
developed literature on adaptive ecosystem management.  Thus, even within the 
comparatively narrow philosophical framework of CBA, the PP can be seen as an 
intelligently designed heuristic device that may be more ecologically rational than deliberate 
optimization techniques, at least when one considers the administrative toll of cost-benefit 
calculation and the fact that much of environmental decisionmaking concerns ill-posed 
problems that do not admit of optimal solutions. 
The PP, however, also has a blind spot.  When read to require affirmative action to 
guard against all environmental, health, and safety risks that meet some threshold of 
significance and scientific credibility, the PP quickly threatens to become an unrealistic and 
unworkable device.  As proponents of CBA have taught us, any attempt to guard against 
environmental, health, and safety risks – including risks that pose catastrophic or irreversible 
consequences – inevitably will entail a series of ripple effects in the market that may 
themselves cause harm.  The fact that the empirical literature documenting such ripple 
effects is fairly weak to date does not mean that the effects should be excluded wholesale 
from consideration.  Such an exclusion would represent the very kind of reaction to 
uncertainty that the PP generally aims to avoid.  Properly understood, therefore, the PP can 
only offer a starting point for societal discussion, a default assumption of extreme 
conservatism that is to be pondered, contested, and overcome through rules of procedure 
and substance about which the PP has little to say. 
Table 1 reflects these complementary blind spots of CBA and the PP, showing that 
each methodology exhibits a measure of respect for complexity in only one domain as 
between biophysical and sociolegal systems.  Table 2 then suggests that the complementary 
                                                 
113 
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blind spots of CBA and the PP can be expected to cause the respective methodologies to err 
in predictable directions in the face of uncertainty.  For instance, given the dearth of 
information regarding the environmental, health, and safety risks of many applications of 
nanotechnology, such as the free release of nanoparticles into ecosystems, regulators 
following either decisionmaking paradigm will tend to display bias with respect to the type of 
error that they incur.  By generally presuming that biophysical systems are well understood, 
resilient, and replaceable, CBA will tend to favour Type I errors, in which regulators permit 
the release of nanoparticles that turn out to be harmful, rather than entertain the opportunity 
cost of prohibiting an activity that might be beneficial.  In contrast, the PP through its 
asymmetric precautionary trigger tends to favour Type II errors, apparently content to 
lament “what might have been” rather than actively permit ecological harm from potentially 
risky substances or activities. 
Table 1 






























Assuming that deep scientific uncertainty will continue to attend much of 
environmental, health, and safety policymaking, the question then becomes how to 
accommodate such uncertainty within the regulatory framework.  The CBA approach seems 
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to assume that uncertainty is simply addressed out there, through institutions and procedures 
that lie beyond the reach of the policy decision under inspection.  This approach comports 
with the general permissiveness adopted in market liberal societies toward private action.  
Following the harm principle articulated by John Stuart Mill, such societies tend to place the 
burden on government regulators to persuasively demonstrate the reality and severity of an 
action’s harmful effects before it may be curtailed.  A basic thrust of the PP approach to 
environmental law and policy is precisely to upset this longstanding allocation of the burden 
of proof, particularly in areas that are thought to be characterized both by scientific 
uncertainty and by the potential for serious or irreversible harmful effects.  At present, 
nanoscale science and engineering appears to be just such an area.  Thus, a literalist 
interpretation of the PP would counsel blocking wide deployment of nanoparticles and other 
fruits of nanoscale science and engineering, at least until their safety and efficacy had been 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of regulators.  Such a strict stance may be undesirable for 
the reasons described above:  Nanoscale science and engineering research promises 
potentially dramatic benefits, in addition to risks, including benefits which themselves take 
the form of improvements to environmental sustainability and human health. 
What is needed, then, is some mechanism for exhibiting symmetric humility –  that 
is, awareness of and respect for the problems of uncertainty and complexity as they 
characterize both biophysical and sociolegal systems.  Environmental assurance bonding 
offers promise in this respect.   
 
Environmental Assurance Bonding.  Under an environmental assurance bonding 
scheme, before commencing an activity with uncertain but potentially serious adverse 
effects, regulated firms would be required to post a bond “equal to the current best estimate 
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of the largest potential future environmental damages.”114  The bond would be returned to 
the firm “if and when the agent could demonstrate that the suspected worst-case damages 
had not occurred or would be less than was originally assessed.”115  If damage did occur, the 
bond funds would be available to rehabilitate the affected environment or to compensate 
injured parties.  As one can see, such an approach “combines the ‘polluter pays’ principle 
with the ‘precautionary’ principle, providing for internalization of costs where harm is 
possible but damages are uncertain.”116  In essence, the bonds work to shift the burden of 
proof off of regulators and onto the promoters of potentially harmful actions, just as 
supporters of the PP have long advocated.117  However, unlike a strict interpretation of the 
PP – which would essentially ban a proposed activity, substance, or technology until its 
promoters had successfully demonstrated the absence of risk – the environmental assurance 
bonding approach allows private action to proceed, albeit under the revised incentive 
structure created by the bond posting requirement. 
A variety of policy design considerations would need to be addressed.  For instance, 
environmental assurance bonds might be used either to guarantee performance of an 
environmental standard, such as reclamation of a former mining or logging site to a specified 
set of conditions, or to guarantee payment of a predetermined amount of money, such as a 
level of damages estimated to be necessary to compensate third parties for harm that might 
be imposed by an uncertain activity.  In addition, the financial instrument actually used to 
                                                 
114 Costanza & Cornwell, supra note __, at __. 
115 Id. at __. 
116 Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity?: Economic Incentive and Biodiversity 
Conservation in the United States (1995) (citing Costanza & Cornwell, supra note __, at 12). 
117 See COMMON, supra note __, at 215-16; Blomquist, supra note __, at 553-54 (stating that 
environmental assurance bond “systems can shift much of the burden of proof from the public to the producer 
in resolving uncertainty as to damages associated with new products”); Gerard, supra note __, at 189 (noting 
that “the bond shifts the burden of proof of a legal dispute from the damages party to the polluter”); Ian 
Bowles, David Downes, Dana Clark, & Marianne Guérin-McManus, Economic Incentives And Legal Tools For 
Private Sector Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 209, 234 (1998). 
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satisfy a bonding requirement could take one of several forms:  (1) collateral bonds such as 
cash deposits, certificates of deposit, letters of credit, or security pledges, (2) so-called “self 
bonds,” which consist of legally binding promissory obligations from regulated entities that 
pass certain tests of financial soundness, or (3) surety bonds which constitute a guarantee 
from a third party to either perform the defaulted obligation or pay funds to the regulating 
agency.  The surety bond approach is likely to be the most attractive, both because it tends 
to be associated with lower costs for regulated firms,118 and because it offers the prospect of 
marshalling the information-generating and risk-evaluating capacities of surety companies in 
service of environmental policy goals.  Surety companies would price bonding services based 
not only on the creditworthiness and compliance history of the regulated firm, but also on 
the estimated likelihood and severity of harm occurring.  This would create a strong 
incentive for firms to reduce the uncertainty surrounding their proposed activities, either by 
investing in the advancement of scientific knowledge or by switching to less dangerous 
alternative activities.  Thus, in the competition for capital, those projects, products, or 
technologies posing less severe potential environmental impacts would obtain a cost 
advantage over alternatives. 
 From the perspective of regulated firms, environmental assurance bonds may 
provide a more equitable policy tool than alternatives such as environmental taxes or 
auctioned pollution permits.  Because taxes and auctioned permits impose a nonrefundable 
fee applied at the time of use, they presuppose an accurate prediction of the long-term costs 
of the regulated activity.  When regulators lack such an accurate prediction, currently 
imposed environmental fees run the risk of overdeterring private activity.  The 
environmental assurance bond, on the other hand, explicitly allows for uncertainty by 
                                                 
118 See Ferreira & Suslick, supra note __, at 43. 
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requiring a pledge of funds to cover the worst-case scenario, but allowing periodic refund of 
such funds as uncertainty dissipates.  Assuming that accounting and tax treatment of pledged 
amounts are properly aligned,119 under the environmental assurance bonding approach “the 
efficiency advantages of economic incentives can be reaped without unduly penalizing 
current economic agents for the cost of unknown future damages.”120 
The most difficult analytical and practical aspect of environmental assurance bonding 
is determining what amount of financial assurance must be pledged.121  The existing 
economic literature tends to assume that the role of environmental assurance bonding is 
simply to guarantee performance according to some prescribed environmental, health, or 
safety standard.122  Moreover, as David Gerard has stressed, “bonding promotes regulatory 
compliance, but it in no way suggests that the standard promulgated by the regulations is 
necessarily efficient.”123  Thus, commentators see the chief benefit of bonding requirements 
to be one of mitigating the risk of default, rather than serving more general environmental 
policy goals.124  Likewise, commentators tend to believe that well-known damage valuations 
are a necessary for environmental assurance bonding schemes to be effective.125  Such 
discussions implicitly assume that regulators operate in a well-characterized policy space, 
wherein thorough empirical understanding of hazards can enable regulators to determine the 
                                                 
119 Id. at __. 
120 See Intarapravich & Clark, supra note __, at 66, and Ferreira & Suslick, supra note __, at 51, for 
discussions of this issue. 
121 See Doneivan F. Ferreira & Saul B. Suslick, Financial Assurance Bonds:  An Incentive Mechanism for 
Environmental Compliance in the Oil Sector, Brazilian Petroleum and Gas Institute – IBP31800 (2001);  
122 See Ferreira & Suslick, supra note __, at 50 (“Setting the appropriate bond requirement (amount) 
may be one of the greatest predicaments within the bonding system.  If bonds are set too low, the system may 
not provide the desired incentive effect.  On the other hand, setting bonds too high may discourage investment 
in the sector.”). 
123 Gerard, supra note __, at 190. 
124 Gerard, supra note __, at 195 (“The underlying motivation [for bonding systems] is the high default 
risk on the side of the agent.”). 
125 See J.F. Hegren, J.A. Herriges, & R. Govindasamy, Limits to Environmental Bonds, 8 ECOL. ECON. 109 
(1993). 
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“optimal” level of precaution.  An alternative viewpoint would regard the generation of 
empirical understanding as part and parcel of the policymaking process itself, such that a 
partial aim of the bonding requirement would be to shift society closer to an epistemic 
position in which it even makes sense to talk about “optimal” levels of precaution.  From 
this perspective, bond posting requirements would not be set at an “optimal” level, but at a 
level commensurate with the worst-case harm scenario that is threatened by a proposed 
activity and that meets some threshold standard of plausibility.  This approach would require 
the development of new analytical tools for imagining and characterizing uncertain threats.  
Proponents of precautionary environmentalism would regard such tools as long overdue.126  
Nevertheless, some commentators argue against setting bond requirements according to 
worst-case scenarios on the ground that reputational costs and ex-post tort liability threats 
provide additional compliance incentives to firms, making the “optimal” bond requirement 
less than the worst-case extreme.127  Again, this argument emerges from a policy framework 
in which scientific understanding and empirical information are treated as exogenous inputs 
to the policymaking process, rather than features of policy spaces that environmental 
assurance bonds themselves might aim to influence. 
This discussion should not be read to suggest that the environmental assurance 
bonding approach is free of limitations.  To begin with, actual historical experience with the 
policy instrument in the context of mining reclamation has generated decidedly mixed 
                                                 
126 Experience with worst-case scenario analysis could have been better developed had the National 
Environmental Policy Act been interpreted to require such analysis.  But see Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).  Guidance provided by the Council on Environmental Quality 
represents one effort to develop a threshold standard of plausibility for worst-case scenario analysis, although 
observers believe the guidance in practice has deterred agencies form undertaking valuable consideration of 
extreme possibilities.  See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (requiring agencies to evaluate “reasonably foreseeable . . . 
impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even in their probability is low, provided that the analysis of 
the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule 
of reason”), and Hodas, supra note __, at 44 (critically assessing the CEQ regulations).  
127 See Gerard & Wilson, supra note __, at 1100. 
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results.  In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Surface Coal Mining and 
Reclamation Act in light of the large number of mining sites that lay abandoned and 
reclaimed across the country.  The Act established performance requirements for the 
reclamation of completed mining sites and required mining permit holders to either achieve 
the requirements or pay an amount necessary for public entities to achieve them.  In 
addition, permit holders are required before the commencement of operations to submit a 
reclamation plan and post a reclamation bond in order to ensure compliance with the 
reclamation requirements.128  Despite the apparent theoretical advantages of bonding as an 
incentive device for environmental compliance, use of the device in the mining sector has 
repeatedly disappointed, chiefly due to the unwillingness of regulators to demand bond 
amounts at levels adequate to ensure coverage of actual reclamation costs.129  Colorado’s 
Summitville Mine, for instance, required over $150 million in reclamation costs due to water 
contamination from the use of cyanide leaching at the site, yet the financial assurance bond 
posted for the mine had been only approximately $5 million.  The Summitville subsidiary 
and its parent company filed for bankruptcy, abandoning the site to the state.130  
Experiments with environmental assurance bonding in other regulatory areas confirm that 
the problem of understated bond amounts is significant.  In Indonesia, for instance, the 
government required the posting of restoration bonds in order to obtain logging 
concessions, yet the per hectare bond fee was set at only a fraction of actual reforestation 
                                                 
128 Reclamation bonds also have been required in Canada, Australia, and several nations in Southeast 
Asia.  See Intarapravich & Clark, supra note __, at 61 tbl. 1. 
129 See, e.g., Craig B. Giffin, West Virginia’s Seemingly Eternal Struggle for a Fiscally and Environmentally 
Adequate Coal Mining Reclamation Bond Program, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 105 (2004); Gerard, supra note __, at 194 
(noting that a General Accounting Office study in 1986 determined that of 556 hardrock mining operations in 
ten states on Bureau of Land Management lands, only one operator had been required to furnish a bond); 
Todd S. Hageman, Comparing the Effectiveness of Oil and Gas with Coal Surface Damage Statutes in Oklahoma:  Bonding 
Producers and Operators to Land Reclamation, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1993). 
130 See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, Ensuring Long-Term Protection of Water Quality at Colorado Mine 
Sites, 30-JUNE COLO. LAW. 83 (2001). 
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costs, thus leading to widespread forfeiture of posted bonds rather than actual 
environmental performance.131 
Additionally, the long latency periods likely to be at issue for many environmental, 
health, and safety risks – including those that might eventually be identified in relation to 
nanotechnology – creates a practical impediment to the implementation of an environmental 
assurance bonding system, given that cause-effect relationship are likely to be especially 
difficult to predict and quantify.132  As David Gerard notes, “[s]urety providers may respond 
to [such] uncertainty by requiring a higher percentage of the bond as a premium, requiring 
substantial collateral, or simply refusing to underwrite the bond.”133  A further option for the 
surety provider is to require the regulated entity to better develop scientific understanding of 
the environmental, health, or safety threat at issue.  Developing private information 
regarding the likelihood of the regulator’s worst-case scenario thus would become a task 
with economic benefit to the firm, rather than an exercise that firms arguably have positive 
incentives not to pursue under current law.134  Proponents of the PP might also argue that, in 
the event a proposed activity is deemed to be uncoverable by the financial industry, then 
society should be relieved that the activity will not proceed.  After all, the point of the 
environmental assurance bonding requirement is to incentivize ex ante consideration of 
potential ex post harms, whenever those harms might possibly occur.  Future generations, in 
that sense, are not exempted from the sphere of regulatory concern.  An alternative 
approach – one more solicitous of private economic activity – would be to apply 
                                                 
131 See David O’Connor, Managing the Environment with Rapid Industrialisation:  Lessons from the 
East Asian Experience 130.  See also Paul Steel & Ece Ozdemiroglu, Examples of Existing Market-Based Instruments 
and the Potential for their Expansion in the Asian and Pacific Region, in Financing Environmentally Sound 
Development 169, 177 (documenting a similar problem in the Philippines). 
132 Gerard & Wilson, supra note __, at 1100 (“Because of uncertainty as time horizons expand, surety 
providers are unlikely to underwrite bonds over time horizons where there is considerable uncertainty.”). 
133 Gerard, supra note __, at 191. 
134 Mary Lyndon, Wendy Wagner. 
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environmental assurance bonding requirements as part of a phased “stewardship regime,” in 
which initial bonding requirements are replaced over time, first by a publicly-managed but 
industry-financed pooled fund insurance mechanism and, eventually, by a full public 
assumption of responsibility and liability for the potentially harmful effects of the regulated 
substance or activity.135   
Finally, the bonding requirement is likely to impose liquidity constraints on firms that 
might, in turn, slow investment and innovation.136  Liquidity constraint problems are 
alleviated in part through the use of third-party surety firms.137  Alternatively, if firms are 
required to post collateral bonds directly, then posted funds could be made interest-bearing 
and fully refundable such that, even while in escrow, they might be used to collateralize loans 
for other investments.  Again, this approach would have the advantage of creating incentives 
for private actors to develop better knowledge regarding the likelihood and severity of 
worst-case risk scenarios, since that information would be necessary to properly estimate the 
value of the collateral bond in the secondary market.  More generally, however, the threat 
posed by environmental assurance bonding schemes to capital availability is one that, at least 
for promoters of the PP, should not necessarily disqualify such schemes from consideration.  
Markets only work to optimize under a given set of constraints; for too long in the eyes of 
PP proponents, industrialized nations have failed to fully include environmental externalities 
within the set of constraints governing private economic behavior.  By shifting to a stance of 
symmetric humility, long-term economic and development equilibriums will be shifted 
toward a “softer,” more environmentally stable path.  In that sense, a retraction of capital 
                                                 
135 See Gerard & Wilson, supra note __, at 1102. 
136  
137 See Gerard, supra note __, at 191. 
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availability under an environmental assurance bonding regime would simply represent the 
transformation of a growth economy to a sustainable economy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Physicist Richard Feynman famously presaged the field of nanotechnology by 
observing that “there’s plenty of room at the bottom.”138  The teachings of complexity 
theory suggest that there also is ample room at the top, where our reductionist habit of 
subdividing scientific investigation and knowledge into separate, narrowly delineated subject 
areas has left a gap of awareness and comprehension regarding complex adaptive systems.  
Moreover, just as scientists expect to achieve interdisciplinary convergence at the nanoscale 
– fusing biology, physics, chemistry, and information technology into a single atomic science 
– so too must policy analysts seek convergence at the macroscale, integrating moral 
philosophy, economics, psychology, and legal knowledge into a unified, pragmatic 
framework for societal risk decisionmaking.  CBA and the PP represent complementary 
attempts to manage such a convergence, focusing on the threats posed to human well-being 
when regulators display insufficient respect for the uncertainty and complexity of, 
respectively, markets and ecosystems.  Despite – or perhaps because of – these deliberate 
focal points, each decisionmaking paradigm is flawed by a failure to recognize the challenges 
posed by uncertainty and complexity in the alternative sphere of concern.  In order to fully 
address the issues that threaten our environmental future, policymakers must therefore begin 
to embrace an ethic of symmetric humility.  One concrete method for doing so is through 
greater use of environmental assurance bonding. 
________ 
                                                 
138 Richard P. Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom, ENG. & SCI. (1960). 
